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The civil war raging between global jihadis is intensifying. 
Despite the shared ideological commitments and mutual 
state adversaries of al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State, these 
dueling factions have failed to overcome the challenge of 
fragmentation under the stress of conflict and territorial 
retreat. Rather than close ranks, these salafi-jihadis have 
accelerated their fratricidal wars in West Africa, Yemen, 
and Afghanistan. They turned their attention away from 
near and far enemies and instead prioritized fighting the 
nearest enemy of all—each other. A recent Islamic State 
documentary, Absolved Before Your Lord, released by 
its Yemeni branch o!ers the clearest articulation of the 
di!erences that divide these two factions. The Islamic State 
represents an exclusive, uncompromising, and puritanical 
vision of jihadism, while al-Qa`ida has rebranded jihadism 
as an inclusive, pragmatic, and populist pan-Islamist 
movement. Five fundamental disagreements emerged 
from the documentary over establishing an ‘Islamic’ state, 
applying ‘Islamic’ law, rejecting populism, embracing 
sectarianism, and defending puritanism.
I t is no secret that salafi-jihadism, the ideology of the dead-liest Islamist organizations around the globe, is in a deep crisis. Despite its rapid growth since 2001, salafi-jihadism (hitherto referred to as jihadism) never constituted a single, unified faction.a Instead, its ideologues and organizations 
often disagree about fundamental issues in the crucible of civil war.1 
Two disagreements in particular have become centrifugal, splinter-
ing jihadis into opposing camps. The first pertains to the issue of 
collective takfir—the act of Muslims declaring other Muslims to be 
infidels—and its byproduct of mass civilian atrocities and sectarian 
targeting. The second revolves around the importance of establish-
a A recent study estimates that adherents of salafi-jihad increased by 270 
percent between 2001 and 2018, numbering in 2018 between 100,000 and 
230,000. As of 2018, there are at least 67 salafi-jihadi groups worldwide, 
a 180-percent increase from 2001. See Seth Jones, Charles Vallee, Danika 
Newlee, Nicholas Harrington, Clayton Sharb, and Hannah Byrne, “The 
Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat: Current and Future Challenges from 
the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Other Groups,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, November 2018, pp. 7-9.
ing ‘Islamic’ states and the application of strict sharia governance 
within those states, which risk alienating local populations and 
turning them against jihadis. These two divides constitute a faction-
al dichotomy between puritanism and populism within jihadism.
The Islamic State has embraced puritanical extremism as its 
defining character. It insists that it constitutes the ‘Victorious Sect’ 
that uncompromisingly adheres to salafi orthodoxy in doctrine 
and practice.2 It takes every opportunity to apply ‘Islamic’ law and 
expunge what it considers ritualistic innovations in its territories; 
rejects alliances with ‘apostate’ parties or states; and seeks to estab-
lish an ‘Islamic’ caliphate without any regard to modern norms of 
national sovereignty. 
This puritanism is juxtaposed with the opportunistic populism 
of Islamist movements that supposedly tolerate public blasphemy 
to avoid alienating supporters; delay establishing sharia-based 
states and instead choose to work within the confines of civil dem-
ocratic states; and make alliances with secular factions or apostate 
governments in the name of realpolitik. Jihadis have historically 
reserved these critiques for Muslim Brotherhood factions and Isla-
mist nationalists like Hamas, but in recent years, the Islamic State 
has been accusing al-Qa`ida of populist Islamism that seeks to win 
the hearts and minds of Muslims rather than mold them into be-
lievers through the strict application of ‘Islamic’ law.3 
It is in this context that on April 29, 2020, the Islamic State 
in Yemen, through its Wilayat Yemen Media Bureau, released a 
52-minute documentary that spotlights al-Qa`ida’s “journey of 
deviations after the so-called Arab Spring revolutions.”4 The docu-
mentary is titled Absolved before Your Lord (ma‘aziratan ila Rabbi-
kum), a reference to the Qur’anic verse 7:164.b In the documentary, 
the Islamic State makes five major claims against al-Qa`ida and, 
in doing so, o!ers the clearest articulation yet of how the two rivals 
di!er (summary in Table 1).
Core Areas of 
Disagreement Islamic State Al-Qa`ida
‘Islamic’ states
Establishes ‘Islamic’ 
states in the territo-
ries it controls
Cautions against the 
formation of ‘Islamic’ 
states at the present 
time 
b In this verse, believers are asked why they continue to warn those whom 
God will destroy or punish harshly. They respond, in order “to be absolved 
[from blame] before your lord and perhaps they may fear Him.” This title 
self-servingly suggests that the Islamic State has sufficiently warned 
al-Qa`ida of its errors, and therefore, it is justified in attacking al-Qa`ida’s 
followers.
Table 1: The di!erences between the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida
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‘Islamic’ law
Insists on establish-
ing sharia laws within 
its territories




Rejects alliances with 
ideologically distant 
factions
Cooperates with a di-
verse range of political 
and military actors




The Islamic State is 
the only jihadi fac-
tion on the pure salafi 
path
The Islamic State is a 
neo-Kharijite devia-
tion from salafism
In the documentary, the Islamic State accuses al-Qa`ida of dith-
ering on the critical issue of erecting an ‘Islamic’ state, a goal that 
is warranted to “harvest the fruits of jihad” and prevent non-salaf-
is from monopolizing political power. Moreover, it is alleged that 
al-Qa`ida, out of concern for public opinion, refuses to apply sharia 
laws within the territories it controls, failing the Qur’anic imper-
ative to “command the good and forbid vice.” Instead, the docu-
mentary alleges al-Qa`ida has chosen to chase after the chimera 
of revolutionary populism, making alliances with apostate factions 
that embrace democracy, nationalism, and secularism. In this vein, 
it is alleged al-Qa`ida and its allies refuse to wage war on polythe-
ists, principally Shi`a Muslims, and that they condemn the destruc-
tion of Sufi shrines. According to the documentary, to add insult to 
injury, al-Qa`ida defames the true monotheists of the Islamic State 
by labeling them Kharijitesc and kills Islamic State soldiers while it 
refuses to cast aspersions on polytheists, nationalists, and misguid-
ed Islamists (for example, the Muslim Brotherhood).
These Islamic State themes are not novel, but they are nonethe-
less significant for two reasons. First, the author assesses, based on 
his close tracking of Islamic State statements over the years, that 
this documentary is the most direct and comprehensive attack on 
al-Qa`ida and many of its branches to date, encompassing criti-
cism of al-Qa`ida in Syria, Mali, Libya, Afghanistan, and Yemen in 
one fell swoop. It suggests that Islamic State leadership is doubling 
down on its branding choice despite the major setbacks it experi-
enced with the demise of its self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and 
Syria and the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It also reveals that 
the Islamic State is further consolidating its central authority over 
its regional commanders in the wilayat (provinces) by diminishing 
their ability to forge tactical alliances with rival jihadis in conflict 
theaters. Second, this latest documentary adds credence to earlier 
CTC Sentinel analysis by Tore Hamming and Hassan Hassan, both 
of whom highlighted the deep roots of puritanical factionalism 
within the jihadi movement—predating the o"cial split between 
these two organizations—and predicting the expansion and endur-
c Jihadis, including members of the Islamic State, are often accused of being 
modern day Kharijites (khawarij al-‘asr), a reference to the historically 
detested sect known for its extremism and violence in Islam’s formative 
period. Kharijites, those who secede from the community, fought Ali Bin 
Abi Talib, the fourth of the Rightly Guided caliphs in the Sunni tradition, and 
eventually assassinated him in 661 C.E. They have earned the reputation of 
being renegades beyond the pale. Interestingly, Islamic State scholars have 
accused internal rivals of being Kharijites. See Cole Bunzel, “Ideological 
Infighting in the Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13:1 (2019): pp. 
13-22. 
ance of factional strife in the years ahead.5 By claiming exclusive 
jihadi legitimacy in the April 2020 documentary, the Islamic State’s 
go-it-alone strategy is intended to preclude calls for factional coex-
istence with al-Qa`ida. Only time will tell whether this strategy is 
a mistake on the part of the Islamic State or a decisive blow to its 
rival’s diminished movement.
This documentary is significant for another reason. It sheds ad-
ditional light on the ongoing power struggle between the Islamic 
State in Yemen and al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
that began in July 2018.6 AQAP is undergoing internal organiza-
tional struggles in light of its recent leadership turnover and be-
cause of a growing controversy over how best to handle allegations 
of spying within the organization. On January 29, 2020, AQAP 
lost its leader, Qasim al-Raymi, to a U.S. drone strike. He was re-
placed by Khaled Batarfi who now presides over a fragmented and 
substantially diminished movement due to a protracted civil war 
with Houthi rebels, continuous U.S. airstrikes on its leadership, and 
internal conflict over how best to redress its compromised organi-
zational security.7 
The Islamic State perceives a window of opportunity to intensify 
its attack on AQAP, one of the largest and most loyal followers of 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qa`ida. Earlier in 2020, the 
Islamic State leaked audio of AQAP members urging al-Zawahiri 
to mediate between AQAP factions over the issue of internal spies 
and collaborators. One faction has wanted an independent tribunal 
to adjudicate charges of spying, but this was rejected out of hand 
by Batarfi because, he maintained, it might reveal critical organiza-
tional security measures. The Islamic State also released the names 
of what it claimed were three executed AQAP members and 18 of its 
leaders and scholars who resigned their positions or turned them-
selves over to Saudi authorities.8 The Islamic State has had every 
intention to add fuel to the rumors that AQAP is infested with spies 
to hasten defections. 
A significant part of the documentary is dedicated to a critique 
of AQAP. It highlights what it claims is the collaboration between 
AQAP leaders and the Yemeni government in their joint war on 
the Houthis, thus o!ering evidence of al-Qa`ida’s supposed alli-
ances with governments that previously killed jihadis and have no 
intention of ruling with ‘Islamic’ law. It also claims AQAP refuses 
to implement ‘Islamic’ rules in areas it controls, which it argues 
is evidence that al-Qa`ida places its political considerations above 
the religious imperative to command the good and forbid vice. The 
documentary further asserts that AQAP turned its territories over 
to local tribal councils and even socialist party o"cials rather than 
seek to install an Islamist government, which it alleges is additional 
proof that al-Qa`ida is too eager to give away the spoils of jihad to 
placate popular sentiment. The documentary concludes with tes-
timonies of several AQAP defectors to the Islamic State in Yemen, 
thus encouraging others to do the same.
In the section that follows, the author o!ers a theoretical frame-
work by which to analyze infighting among militant organizations 
that share the same ideological genealogy. Revolutionary move-
ments from the same family tree often disagree about core conflict 
issues such as who are their adversaries, what are the best strategies 
to defeat them, and what are legitimate ways to fight them. These 
disagreements often yield a split between purists and pragmatists, 
dividing the loyalties of the broader movement between two viable 
alternatives. Such family feuds can be particularly threatening to 
militant organizations that draw their recruits and resources from 
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the same constituent pool, resulting in a zero-sum competition be-
tween two rival factions. Next, the article illustrates this ideological 
dynamic by discussing how the Islamic State draws a sharp divide 
with all other Islamist factions by spotlighting five areas of disagree-
ments with its closest rival, al-Qa`ida. The author concludes by 
discussing the implications of jihadi fragmentation for countering 
violent extremism, highlighting both the dangers and opportunities 
of the ongoing civil war within jihadism. 
A Family Feud: Theorizing the al-Qa`ida-Islamic 
State Schism
It might be surprising to some that two organizations that embrace 
an identical ideology, jihadism, might clash in the name of that ide-
ology. It is not uncommon, however, for militant organizations with 
shared ideological origins to compete with each other based on their 
degree of pragmatism vs. extremism or populism vs. vanguardism.9d 
Factional conflicts are not confined to Islamist movements, but 
instead are part of a historic pattern that includes iconic rivalries 
such as the May 1937 clashes between Stalinists and Trotskyists 
during the Spanish Civil War, the Haganah and Revisionist Zionists 
in Palestine prior to Israel’s independence (1931-1948), the Algeri-
an National Movement and the National Liberation Front during 
their anti-colonial struggle against France (1954-1962), and the Sri 
Lankan Tamil Tigers and its four rival Tamil factions in the mid-
1980s. 
The process of competition between rivals can be threatening 
to some factions, leading them to consider violent escalation as a 
response to these new threats. Competition from rivals can lead to 
political marginalization in the militant movement if one group is 
outmaneuvered. Competition can also unleash fear of internal de-
fections. Militant leaders could see their fighters or entire brigades 
abandon them to join their rivals, taking away valuable territory 
and resources in the process. Competition can also result in betray-
al. Militant groups may see their competitors negotiate with the 
d Ironically, Ayman al-Zawahiri, before joining al-Qa`ida, disagreed with 
Egyptian Islamists on the question of populism vs. vanguardism. His rivals 
in the Egyptian Islamic Group favored a populist social movement approach 
to revolutionary change, but al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad insisted on a 
cohesive vanguard military strategy to overthrow the Egyptian regime.
government or switch to the government side.e
Organizational rivals from the same ideological family tree are 
particularly threatening to one another because they are competing 
for the same constituency from which they seek recruits, funding, 
and safe haven. Their ideological proximity to each other due to 
their common intellectual heritage makes them credible voices to 
the movement’s fighters, supporters, and sponsors over which they 
compete. Yet their ideological distance on key conflict issues means 
that their disagreements can divide their fighters, followers, and 
sponsors between two viable alternatives. This proximity-distance 
paradox threatens to produce defections from one’s group to a rival 
faction and, if unchecked, can result in the marginalization of one 
faction in a zero-sum competition. Thus, kindred movements—as 
in the case of al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State—can turn to bitter 
enemies despite their mutual intellectual origins and shared uto-
pian vision.
Specifically, the Islamic State-al-Qa`ida split can be analyzed 
along three ideological dimensions: conflict framing, conflict ob-
jectives, and conflict targeting. Conflict framing refers to how a 
faction constructs a shared understanding of the conflict in which 
it is an active participant. It answers the basic question: who are we 
fighting against? The classic debate among jihadis has been wheth-
er to prioritize their near enemies (local regimes) or far enemies 
(Western states).10 Al-Qa`ida, under the leadership of Usama bin 
Ladin, answered with the latter. However, the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 and the subsequent rise of powerful Shi`a movements and 
governments led some jihadis to revert back to emphasizing threats 
stemming from domestic regimes and their local auxiliaries. The 
rise of the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006 refocused jihadism on pri-
oritizing attacks against the near enemy, emphasizing the sectarian 
nature of the new Iraqi polity as opposed to the U.S. occupation of 
e The most instructive example of this side-switching dynamic is what 
happened to al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), the predecessor of the Islamic State, 
in 2006-2008. In that time period, many of its former insurgent and tribal 
allies defected to the U.S. side under the Sons of Iraq and Tribal Awakening 
initiatives to drive AQI out of their towns and cities. Carter Malkasian, 
Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Mohammed M. Hafez, “Al-Qa`ida 
Losing Ground in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 1:1 (2007). It should be noted that in 
October 2006, AQI began operating under the name the Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI).
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the country.f 
This reprioritization of the near enemy above the far enemy was 
an important source of tension between al-Qa`ida’s leadership in 
Pakistan and its a"liate in Iraq, but did not result in a complete 
organizational schism at the time.11 The strategic gulf widened 
further during the outbreak of Arab Spring revolutions that sub-
stantially weakened the repressive apparatuses of several authori-
tarian regimes. Jihadis appeared better positioned than ever to take 
advantage of state weakness to topple domestic governments and 
establish Islamist states in their stead.12 The rise of the Islamic State 
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was a step in that direction, but al-Qa-
`ida resisted the siren call of the Islamic State and advocated for 
strategic patience. It framed Arab revolutions as a transition phase 
that requires cross-coalition mobilization to ensure that entrenched 
political elites are removed from power and hostile states are not 
provided a pretext to intervene on behalf of the ancien régime.13
Conflict objectives answers the question: what are we fighting 
for? Ideologically proximate groups could still disagree about the 
nature of the polity they seek to establish and the scope and pace of 
revolutionary change, as well as its territorial limits. Both al-Qa`ida 
and the Islamic State aspire to a sharia-based polity in which ‘Islam-
ic’ law reigns supreme and in which, from their perspective, ‘Islamic’ 
authorities, from the Sunni tradition, are given their proper place in 
the judiciary. Al-Qa`ida, having drawn costly lessons from failed ji-
hads, has advocated for gradualism in implementing its vision of an 
‘Islamic’ order. Al Qa`ida has argued that there is little to be gained 
in establishing states that make glaring targets for foreign powers, 
or marching toward ‘Islamic’ governance without the support of 
the masses. The Islamic State, however, asserted its prerogative to 
carve out territory for Sunnis and establish states that rule with 
‘Islamic’ law; anything short of that would, from their point of view, 
violate God’s imperative to command the good and prohibit vice. 
The Islamic State declared a territorial caliphate without regard to 
other militant groups, including Islamists and salafis, that did not 
wish to break up their territorial states along sectarian divides nor 
rule them with strict sharia law.  
Conflict targeting answers the question: who can we legitimately 
attack? While targeting is usually a tactical or strategic issue, it can 
be ideological if certain categories of people are deemed to be irre-
deemable enemies by the mere fact that they represent a detested 
out-group.14 Al-Qa`ida, true to its novel strategy of fighting the ‘far 
enemy’ and increasingly sensitive to the criticism that it kills fel-
low coreligionists, has in recent years sought to minimize sectarian 
targeting and its associated practice of collectively anathematizing 
(takfir) non-Sunni communities.g The Islamic State, conversely, 
insisted that it was both a religious obligation and a public good 
to target Shi`a communities and Sufi shrines to purge the earth of 
what the group views as their misguidance. 
f Interestingly, a 2009 strategic document by the Islamic State of Iraq 
framed its targeting policy reorientation with the phrase “nine bullets plus 
one,” meaning 90 percent of its attacks would target local adversaries while 
10 percent would be dedicated to attacking U.S. forces in Iraq. The Arabic 
document, translated by the author, carries the title “A Strategic Plan to 
Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq” and can be 
found at https://mohammedhafez.academia.edu/research#papers
g Al-Zawahiri, for example, issued instructions to his followers to exercise 
restraint toward “deviant sects” in an audio message titled “General 
Guidelines for Jihad,” released by al-Sahab Media on September 14, 2013.
Thus, despite their shared normative commitments and mutu-
al state adversaries, al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State have failed to 
overcome the challenge of factionalism that tore asunder many oth-
er ideological movements. The stress of conflict and the urgency for 
survival did little to bind them into a singular unified movement. In 
fact, beginning in 2013, they descended into fratricidal violence in 
multiple conflict zones, starting in Syria and extending to Libya, Ye-
men, and Afghanistan. For a period of time, the one exception was 
the relatively cooperative relationship between the Islamic State in 
the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the al-Qa`ida a"liate Jama’at Nus-
rat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), both in the West African Sahel 
region. However, even there this mutually understanding between 
rivals, built on common origins, personal connections, and com-
mon enemies, broke down in the summer of 2019. Since July of that 
year, at least 300 jihadis have perished in factional wars between 
the ISGS and JNIM.15
The Nearest Enemy: The Islamic State Rebukes 
al-Qa`ida 
The Islamic State’s recent barrage of verbal salvos aimed at al-Qa-
`ida comes in the midst of protracted factional wars between their 
a"liated groups on several jihadi fronts, extending from the North 
and West African Sahel regions, Libya, and Somalia to Yemen, Syria, 
and Afghanistan.16 The Islamic State’s aforementioned April 2020 
documentary, Absolved before Your Lord, draws attention to these 
conflicts and frames them as a sharp divide between puritanism 
and populism. It brands the Islamic State as exclusively committed 
to the pure salafi creed, regardless of the cost and consequences, 
and presents al-Qa`ida as having deviated from the salafi way in 
pursuit of false revolutionary slogans and mass public support.
Establishing an ‘Islamic’ State and Applying ‘Islamic’ Law 
The first two themes of the Islamic State documentary are closely 
integrated together. The Islamic State accuses al-Qa`ida of refusing 
to take up what it believes is the historic responsibility of establish-
ing ‘Islamic’ states in territories it controls and applying ‘Islamic’ 
law within those states. Instead, it is claimed that al-Qa`ida has 
surrendered the “fruits of jihad” to ersatz Islamists who abide by 
notions of civil democratic states or, equally unacceptably, to popu-
lar committees composed of a mix of Islamists, secular nationalists, 
socialists, and tribal figures. For the Islamic State, these are forces 
of blasphemy and apostasy that will never permit the application of 
‘Islamic’ law. As the documentary puts it, “they replaced one tyrant 
with another, and have substituted polytheists with others who are 
even more blasphemous toward God.” According to the documenta-
ry, al-Qa`ida foolishly anticipates cooperation from these factions, 
but sooner or later, it will “reap the bitter harvest” of betrayal.h 
These allies will turn their guns on the jihadis as they have already 
demonstrated in Iraq, Syria, Mali, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan. Worse 
still, it asserts, al-Qa`ida excuses its blasphemy in the name of toler-
ance and gradualism, all while it derides the true monotheists (i.e., 
Islamic State members) and fights them at every juncture.
h This reference to the “bitter harvest” is not incidental. It mocks Ayman 
al-Zawahiri by alluding to his earlier work of criticism against the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, The Bitter Harvest: Sixty Years of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Arabic book was published in the late 1980s, but the 
author has the version published in 1999 by the Beirut press Dar al-Bayariq.
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The debate over establishing ‘Islamic’ states is not new, to be 
sure. Jihadis have disagreed about when and where to establish ‘Is-
lamic’ states in Algeria, Iraq, and Syria in the last three decades. Al-
though they all share the ambition of reviving an ‘Islamic’ caliphate 
that unites the ummah (Muslim nation) across borders, not all see 
this goal as immediately attainable. Therefore, they disagree about 
the strategic priorities necessary to achieve this long-term objective. 
From the broad corpus of jihadi thought, it is possible to dis-
cern three separate views on the issue of a territorial state. The first 
view comes from al-Qa`ida, which holds that establishing ‘Islamic’ 
states is not a priority under the present circumstances; indeed, 
it is counterproductive. Precedence should be given to supporting 
revolutions against entrenched regimes and depriving counterrev-
olutionary elites from exploiting the jihadi bogeyman to undermine 
popular support for these revolutions. Al-Qa`ida believes they 
should seize these opportunities to establish their organizational 
presence—even if through indirect front organizations—and o!er 
their support and experience in consolidating revolutionary turn-
over.17 This strategy involves stepping back from the demand of es-
tablishing an ‘Islamic’ state and making tactical alliances with local 
revolutionaries, sidestepping some of their ideological di!erences, 
and refraining from controversial policies that might alienate local 
populations, including sectarian killings, demolishing Sufi shrines, 
or governing with strict sharia codes.
The second view comes from local jihadis mired in civil wars. 
These include the Taliban in Afghanistan and Ahrar al-Sham in 
Syria, to give just two examples. These groups are fighting to topple 
their regimes in order to establish ‘Islamic’ states within the frame-
work of the modern nation-state. Their territorial vision is confined 
to their existing borders; they are not interested in abrogating their 
states’ territorial integrity. Thus, they generally refrain from talking 
about an ‘Islamic’ caliphate that promises to upend the Westphalian 
system of sovereign states.
The third view comes from the Islamic State. It harbors the ir-
redentist ambition of restoring an ‘Islamic’ caliphate over territo-
ries that were divided by Western powers after the First World War 
(the so-called Sykes-Picot borders). The Islamic State cares little 
about state sovereignty, the complex political considerations of lo-
cal Islamist factions, or the interests of external powers. Whereas 
al-Qa`ida and other Islamists seek to work hand-in-hand with their 
beleaguered populations in order to win their hearts and minds, the 
Islamic State cares little about populism and instead advances an 
exclusive, vanguardist vision that seeks to mold hearts and minds 
through the divine imperative to command the good and forbid 
vice.18 As a result, it seizes every opportunity to carve out a terri-
torial state from within and across sovereign state boundaries and 
governs with a strict sharia code without regard to local customs 
and religious sensitivities.
Rejecting Unholy Alliances 
According to the April 2020 Islamic State documentary, al-Qa`ida 
has forged unholy alliances with parties that either do not adhere 
to the strictures of salafism or that clearly exploit local and trans-
national jihadis without ever intending to advance their Islamist 
projects. The documentary spotlights al-Qa`ida’s alliance with the 
“heathenistic” Taliban despite its “clear deviations and apostasy.”i 
The Taliban is faulted for having, according to the Islamic State, 
deep ties to the “apostate” Pakistani intelligence services and for 
recognizing the Islamic Republic of Iran and its borders. The Tal-
iban is also criticized for negotiating a peace deal with the United 
States in alleged exchange for it fighting the Islamic State. 
In Syria, the Islamic State’s documentary points out that Jabhat 
al-Nusra, before it ever distanced itself from al-Qa`ida, had di-
rect alliances with factions sponsored by Gulf states and Turkey, a 
NATO member. This cooperation, according to the documentary, 
does not augur well for establishing genuine ‘Islamic’ governance in 
the region. Similarly, in Yemen, the documentary underscores what 
it alleges is the direct and intimate cooperation between AQAP 
commanders and Yemeni government forces fighting against the 
Houthis under a Saudi-led coalition. These are presented as strange 
bedfellows more likely to result in betrayal, not an ‘Islamic’ order. 
The documentary also derides Ayman al-Zawahiri as “the na-
tion’s laughingstock” (saafih al-umma) after he, according to the 
Islamic State’s telling of events, exhibited respect for the Muslim 
Brotherhood government in Egypt before it was toppled in 2013 
and appeared sympathetic to the plight of its deposed leader Mo-
hammed Morsi. According to the Islamic State, al-Zawahiri im-
parted legitimacy on a faction it labels al-ikhwan al-murtadin 
(the Apostate Brotherhood), one that “harbors under its Islamic 
patina the jahili (pagan) doctrines of nationalism, patriotism, and 
democracy.”
Embracing Sectarianism
The Islamic State is unapologetically sectarian, viewing as its mis-
sion the annihilation of the Shi`a sect and the destruction of Sufi 
symbols of heresy. It rationalizes this genocidal violence under the 
theological aegis of collective takfir. In the April 2020 documenta-
ry, the Islamic State scolds al-Qa`ida for refusing to embrace sectar-
ian targeting because doing so would alienate mass public opinion. 
It highlights Ayman al-Zawahiri’s prior statements in which he re-
jects giving priority to fighting Shi`a, excusing them on the basis of 
their “ignorance” and insisting that the best way to deal with them 
is by proselytization and socialization, not sectarian conflict. It also 
chides him for making an ecumenical public outreach to Coptic 
Christians in Egypt and calling them “our partners in this home-
land.”j Lastly, the Islamic State criticizes the Taliban for, in its telling 
of events, protecting the Hazari Shi`a rather than killing them.k   
The killing of coreligionists poses the greatest di"culty for ji-
i The Islamic State uses the Arabic adjective wathaniyya to describe the 
Taliban, which it casts as idolatrous because of its Hanafi-Maturidi-
Deobandi theology that permits Sufism and jurisprudential eclecticism. 
The term wathaniyya also mocks the Taliban’s nationalist (wataniyya) 
orientation, which confines its armed struggle to ethnic Pashtuns inside of 
Afghanistan. 
j This criticism of al-Zawahiri dates back to 2016. In an audio message 
released on January 5, 2017, al-Zawahiri rebutted these chargers by 
clarifying that what he meant by Coptic Christians being “our partners in 
this homeland” was a mere reference to “agriculture, trade, and money… 
in accordance with the laws of our sharia.” See “Al-Qaeda Chief Ayman al-
Zawahiri Calls ISIS ‘Liars,’” Al Arabiya, January 6, 2017.     
k This claim by the Islamic State is the most puzzling given the long history 
of victimization that the Hazaris have endured at the hands of the Taliban 
while in power and during their nearly two decades of insurgency in 
Afghanistan. See Bismellah Alizada, “What Peace Means for Afghanistan’s 
Hazara People,” Al Jazeera, September 18, 2019.
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hadis from an ‘Islamic’ jurisprudential perspective as well as a 
public relations standpoint. It is no surprise, therefore, that this 
practice has unleashed intense criticisms by other jihadis who are 
concerned about the permissibility of this violence and its political 
repercussions. The practice of takfir, especially the controversy over 
the collective anathematization of the Shi`a and Sufis, has been a 
major vulnerability for militant Islamists, one that they have been 
trying to mitigate through theological nuance. Al-Qa`ida pragma-
tists have argued that takfir must be confined to individuals sub-
ject to strict rules of due process. The Islamic State since its origins 
with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of al-Qa`ida in Iraq, has 
insisted that collective takfir is permissible since jihadis are in no 
position to adjudicate apostasy cases individually under present 
circumstances.19   
The Islamic State today asserts that it does not indulge public 
opinion when it comes to ahkam shar‘iyya (divine judgments). It 
holds that certain beliefs and practices nullify a person’s status as a 
Muslim, leaving the pious no option but to label that person an in-
fidel unless she or he returns to the right path. Otherwise, the lives 
and property of an apostate are no longer sacrosanct and can be 
expropriated without compunction. This rule, the group believes, 
applies to the Shi`a and cannot be suspended under the pretext of 
considering public opinion.
Defending Puritanism
Al-Qa`ida and other jihadis have denounced the Islamic State as 
modern-day Kharijites, extremists that kill Muslims—even fellow 
jihadis—simply for failing to give their oath of allegiance (bay`a) to 
its organization.20 These criticisms have hit a nerve with the Islamic 
State as evidenced by how much time and e!ort it gives to rebutting 
these claims. The Islamic State asserts exclusive jihadi legitimacy; 
it alone waves the banner of monotheism and defends itself against 
apostates and hypocrites who have coalesced against it. 
According to the April 2020 Islamic State documentary, al-Qa-
`ida casts aspersions on the puritanical monotheists even as it 
refrains from uttering one derogatory word toward secularists, 
Shi`a, Christians, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In the name of 
strategic advantage, it is alleged to tolerate allies with blasphemous 
doctrines, no matter how egregious, but refuses to join the Islamic 
State, which has succeeded in capturing territory and is applying 
‘Islamic’ law. The Islamic State documentary alleges al-Qa`ida 
avoids attacking polytheists (a reference to Sufis and Shi`a) by ex-
cusing their ‘ignorance’ while making its top priority fighting and 
killing the righteous soldiers of the Islamic State.
The Islamic State is adamant in rejecting the neo-Kharijite label 
and turns the tables on al-Qa`ida by insisting that its leaders after 
the death of bin Ladin and Anwar al-Awlaki, to name just two, have 
deviated from the salafi paradigm and compromised on core issues 
of creed. It argues al-Qa`ida is not fit to lead other Islamists on 
the battlefield because it will lead them astray. The Islamic State 
presents itself as exclusively legitimate because it puts jihad in the 
service of monotheism, not nationalism, democracy, or populism. It 
insists on establishing an ‘Islamic’ caliphate without regard to mod-
ern international norms; it applies Islamic law with or without the 
approval of the masses; and it rejects alliances with non-Muslims 
in accordance with the principle of wala’ wal bara’ (loyalty to Islam 
and disavowal of infidels). It will either triumph and reap the fruits 
of jihad or die honorably advancing its puritanical vision.   
Implications
At its point of origins, jihadism represented a clear alternative to 
prevailing Islamist trends, principally the non-violent activism of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the territorial parochialism of Islamic na-
tionalists, and the political quietism of salafi scholars. Adherents of 
salafi jihadism became the most aggressive proponents of pan-Is-
lamic unity. Yet, paradoxically, jihadis never cohered into a united 
front. Instead, they became divided by new ideological, strategic, 
and tactical di!erences. Consequently, their pan-Islamist move-
ment is once again in tatters.
Specifically, jihadis have diverged on critical issues such as col-
lective takfir (excommunication of Muslims), sectarian targeting, 
and the importance of a sharia-governed territorial state. These dis-
agreements produced distinct repertoires of violence among their 
adherents in important conflict zones such as Iraq and Syria. It also 
led to a violent rupture between al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State, 
two of the most important proponents of pan-Islamist jihadism to-
day, setting in motion intense intra-jihadi conflicts in Libya, Yemen, 
Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and most recently West Africa.# 
Western observers may take comfort in the fact that violent ex-
tremists are at each other’s throats, but this would be the wrong 
implication to draw. Since 9/11, the problem of violent jihadis has 
grown in scale, scope, and violent magnitude—all this despite being 
divided and pursued by a super power, multinational coalitions, and 
local governments. Whereas in the past the international commu-
nity was dealing with one global jihadi movement headquartered 
in Afghanistan, today there are two with branches that span several 
regions and countries. These jihadis have proven their ability to 
plan operations and fight their adversaries even as they are killing 
each other. 
More ominous is the potential for terrorist outbidding by both 
of these organizations. It is known from numerous studies that 
militant organizations facing serious rivals use outbidding strat-
egies to capture a greater share of media coverage, recruits, and 
financing.21 A faction facing the prospect of marginalization into 
obscurity might ratchet up violence to exhibit superior commit-
ment to the cause, or it can engage in bold terrorist innovations like 
al-Qa`ida executed on 9/11 to show greater e"cacy than its rivals.22 
Thus, intra-factional struggle to consolidate power behind one of 
two competing visions of transnational jihadism should not be con-
fused with imminent jihadi defeat. Vigilance and well-considered 
long-term strategies are still necessary to contain and defeat this 
multipronged threat.  
Notwithstanding these dynamics, factional strife does not bode 
well for jihadi victory. Research shows that united movements are 
more likely to achieve their objectives than divided ones.23 United 
movements are better able to harness resources against state adver-
saries, negotiate with a single voice, and attract external sponsors. 
Conversely, divided movements waste their resources fighting ri-
vals, are vulnerable to spoilers during negotiations, and appear as 
lost causes to external sponsors. Factional conflicts also encourage 
militant defections away from the movement and toward the state, 
which is what happened in Algeria during the 1990s and in Iraq 
during the American occupation.24 In recent years, jihadi factional 
strife encouraged some jihadis to side with non-Islamists in order 
to balance against their jihadi rivals. Interestingly, the April 2020 
Islamic State documentary accuses Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qa`ida’s 
former a"liate in Syria, of collaborating with secular nationalists 
to fight the soldiers of the caliphate. 
In sum, the crisis within jihadism presents counterextremist 
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forces with opportunities to discredit this movement by highlight-
ing its internal fragmentation and ideological incoherence. It also 
presents them with openings to diminish movement cohesion and 
encourage defections to the state. Local tribes and populations 
caught in the cross-fire of factional rivals can be persuaded to side 
with the forces of law and order to restore security and stability to 
their regions. Lastly, in theaters where the defeat of jihadis is not 
imminently attainable, counterextremist forces could encourage 
factional rivalries to preclude the consolidation of power behind a 
united movement and ensure continuous strife among what would 
otherwise be brothers-in-arms.     CTC
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